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Thank you very much for your kind introduction. It is my great honor to speak as 
a dinner speaker at the 2011 Advanced Summer School of Nuclear Engineering 
and Management with Social-Scientific Literacy. The given title of my speech is; 
“From Fukushima to the World: How to learn from the Japan’s experiences.” This 
is a great title and I wish to make personal remarks tonight, so please note that 
this is not necessarily representing the views of Japan Atomic Energy Commission 
(JAEC) or the government of Japan. Before I start my speech, I would like to 
make a few remarks on my personal feelings on this issue.
First is “sympathy.” I would like to express my deepest sympathy and condo-
lences for victims of the Earthquake and Tsunami, and their families. In particular, 
my personal sympathy goes to people who have been forced to evacuate from their 
own homes and land. Even after several months they are not sure when they will 
be able to go back to their own homes and some fear that they may not be able to 
ever return. It is heartbreaking to watch the site and hear people’s anger, frustra-
tion, and anxiety over the accident and their future.
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Second is “regret.” As a researcher working on nuclear energy policy for over 
30 years and as a government official, I am truly regretful for what happened at 
Fukushima. How could this have happened? Why could we not prevent the acci-
dent? How can we prevent such nuclear disasters in the future? These are the 
questions that I have been asking myself every day since March 11. It is our 
responsibility to answer these questions with complete transparency and sincerity. 
This is the only way, I believe, to restore the trust lost by this accident.
Third is “thank you.” I would like to express my sincere thanks for all the assis-
tance and heartwarming support given to us by the U.S. and many other countries 
after the Earthquake and the accident. I also thank you for this great opportunity to 
give a talk in front of distinguished experts and outstanding students who are pon-
dering the future of nuclear energy. To be honest, I do not have any good answer 
regarding the future of nuclear power. I am sure that not only experts but general 
citizens are also concerned about the future of nuclear power. In this context, I 
am convinced that it is my (and Japan’s) responsibility to share information and 
experiences about the accident to the greatest extent possible so that you can make 
better decisions. That is why I have been accepting as many invitations as possible 
to speak on Fukushima since May 2011.
Today, though, it may take too much time to give you speech I prepared for 
other international conferences which consists of more than 60 slides. Instead, I 
will summarize four major points which are: the seriousness of the accident, 
securing safety of the public and the environment, energy and nuclear energy pol-
icy, and implications for international society.
First, how serious is this accident? It is clear to everyone that the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident is one of the worst in global nuclear history. It is unique in the 
sense that it was triggered by a massive earthquake and tsunami, which resulted in 
three core meltdowns and four explosions at one site. A large amount of radioac-
tive release occurred which forced more than 80,000 people to evacuate, and it 
is not yet completely under control, more than four months after the accident. In 
terms of the quantitative impact of the accident, the International Nuclear Events 
Scale (INES) scale is now rated as Level 7, but I believe the social consequences 
of this accident cannot be expressed by this single number. The most serious social 
consequence of this accident is “loss of public trust in Japan’s governance over 
nuclear safety.” JAEC issued statements on this point as follows: 
We are gravely concerned about this accident which can fundamentally undermine public 
trust in safety measures, not only in Japan but also in other countries [1]. 
[t]he people’s confidence in the adequacy of the risk management activities has been 
lost due to the occurrence of this accident [2].
While it is technically possible to take measures to enhance nuclear safety respond-
ing to this accident, it will be extremely difficult to restore public trust in the near 
future. This is the biggest challenge, I believe, for Japan’s nuclear energy policy.
Second, we must secure public safety and restore the environment. This is the 
top priority of the government, but so far the results of its efforts are not com-
pletely satisfactory. There are many challenges that we must face. Managing 
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a large amount of highly contaminated water is one big challenge on site. 
Continuous monitoring and drawing a more detailed “contamination map” is 
another. Huge efforts may be required to decontaminate the land/water and to 
assure that people can return without fear of radiation. And it will probably take 
decades to remove spent fuel from the reactors and to completely decommission 
all four reactors. This is a huge, very expensive, very complex, and unprecedented 
challenge which we have never faced before. We may need new technologies to 
cope with these difficult tasks. I believe we need a systematic, strategic, and well-
planned approach to complete this process. We probably need a new institutional 
scheme as we must deal with technological, economical, legal, and social issues. 
International cooperation on this matter is essential. JAEC also issued a statement 
on this issue: 
The government should develop an organizational framework to promptly and effec-
tively carry out such emergency measures, … and if necessary, it should develop the legal 
framework required for each measure, and immediately start on such steps as implement-
ing demonstration tests on effective technology [2].
Third, we must formulate an overall energy and nuclear energy policy. The top 
priority on this issue is how to secure the safety of existing nuclear power plants 
and gain public trust. This is a short-term energy policy issue, but critically impor-
tant for long-term energy future, too. Unless we regain public trust in the safety 
of existing nuclear power plants, it is not possible to discuss a positive future for 
nuclear power in Japan. Unfortunately, public trust in nuclear safety regulation has 
been completely lost. The government plans to separate the Nuclear and Industry 
Safety Agency (NISA) from its parent body, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI); and the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) will probably be 
incorporated into a new safety regulatory agency. Restructuring the nuclear regula-
tory agency alone may not be enough to regain public trust.
In this context, the Government’s report to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) issued in June states: 
it is necessary for Japan to conduct national discussions on the proper course for nuclear 
power generation while disclosing the actual costs of nuclear power generation, including 
the costs involved in ensuring safety [3].
I agree. We need an innovative policy making process, stimulating public debate 
and incorporating public input while still being based on scientific evidence. Do 
we have such a forum? One possible social function that we need is an institution 
dedicated to Technology Assessment (TA) which can provide objective and unbi-
ased assessment of societal implications of science and technology. Information 
disclosure with proper assessment is critically important for informed public 
debate.
For a longer term energy policy, the newly created “Energy and Environment 
Council” released its interim report on July 29, 2011, outlining a basic new 
energy policy. There are three basic philosophies: (1) Three principles toward a 
new best energy mix (reducing dependency on nuclear power, strategic approach 
for energy security, complete reevaluation of nuclear energy policy); (2) Three 
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principles toward a new energy system (realization of a distributed energy  system, 
international contribution, multi-perspective approach); (3) Three principles 
toward national consensus (national debate in order to overcome “pro-” “anti-” 
conflict, strategy based on objective data, dialogue with various sectors of the 
public). The Council also suggests that it will re-evaluate costs of nuclear power 
considering the impact of the accident. Given public opinion polls (more than 
60 % of the public are now in favor of “phasing out” nuclear power), “reducing 
dependency on nuclear power” is probably the likely outcome of the new energy 
policy. But it is not yet certain how soon, how much, and what other energy 
sources will fill the gap.
Fourth, we must address implications for international society. This accident is 
not just a Japanese accident, and has already had significant impacts on the global 
nuclear energy picture. There are more than 400 nuclear power plants worldwide 
and it is critically important to assure the safety of those plants. In this context, it is 
Japan’s responsibility to share our information and experiences as much as possible. 
One concern is that the world is now clearly divided into two groups, “pro-nuclear” 
and “anti-(including phasing out) nuclear.” This trend, which existed before but was 
much more subtle, is now clearly changing the global politics of nuclear power. It is 
getting more difficult to reach a consensus on nuclear energy policy, although there 
is a growing consensus on enhancing nuclear safety in general.
At the recent UN Conference on Nuclear Disarmament held in Matsumoto 
City, Japan, July 27–29, 2011, there was an interesting discussion on civilian 
nuclear power. Under the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Article IV guarantees 
the “inalienable right” of the peaceful use of nuclear power by member countries. 
But Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, former co-chairperson of International Commission 
on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), suggested that there 
should be “responsibility” concerning use of nuclear power. However, there was 
a strong statement by Dr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that “global use of nuclear power will continue to 
grow in the coming decades and it will remain an important option for many coun-
tries.” There was still another important issue emerging from the Fukushima acci-
dent. That is the common characteristic of “nuclear safety” and “nuclear security,” 
especially the safety and security issue associated with spent fuel storage which 
has become a major policy issue for the international community.
I would like to conclude my talks with the following remarks.
First, we should be able to overcome this tragic accident with our wisdom. 
Never give up. Yes, this is an unprecedented crisis, but crisis can be an oppor-
tunity. We will draw lessons and come up with innovative ideas to improve the 
safety of nuclear power plants and to clean up the site. If we cannot control 
nuclear energy, how can we control nuclear weapons? We should overcome this 
man-made disaster with a humble attitude towards nature and science/technolo-
gies. I truly believe that the international community can work together with Japan 
to overcome this crisis.
Second, let’s make Fukushima a symbol of “recovery.” Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were victims of nuclear destruction, but became symbols of “peace.” 
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Fukushima is now victim of one of the most serious nuclear accidents in human 
history. But, I sincerely believe that Fukushima can become a symbol of “recov-
ery.” This should be the goal of the Japanese government, and I personally will do 
my best to achieve this goal as a government official and as an individual.
Finally, in order to achieve the above two goals, I believe that the role of sci-
entists, like yourselves, can be extremely significant. One of the important les-
sons we learned from the Fukushima accident is that closer collaboration between 
nuclear engineers/scientists and scientists in other fields, especially social sci-
entists, is definitely needed to improve the “safety culture” of the nuclear com-
munity. I believe this summer school has already played a very important role 
in achieving this important goal. I appreciate and congratulate you on all of the 
efforts you have made, and I hope my talk today has contributed to a better under-
standing of the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident.
Thank you very much for your attention.
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